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Abstract: A numerical study has been performed comparing the hazards, in 
particular overpressures, arising from the sustained unignited and 
ignited release from an onboard hydrogen storage tank at 700 bar through 
a 3.34 mm diameter orifice, representing a thermally activated pressure 
relief device (TPRD) in a small garage with a single vent equivalent in 
area to small window. It has been demonstrated how the overpressure 
predicted in the case of an unignited release using both CFD and an 
analytical model is in the region of 0.55 kPa and thus unlikely to cause 
structural damage. However, the overpressure predicted for the ignited 
release is two orders of magnitude greater, reaching over 55 kPA in less 
than 1 s and thus potentially causing destruction of the structure.  
 
It has been shown that whilst the overpressures resulting from the 
unignited release are unlikely to cause harm, the garage is engulfed by a 
flammable atmosphere in less than 1 s and the oxygen is depleted to 
levels dangerous to people within this time. In the case of the ignited 
release, whilst the resultant overpressures are the primary safety 
concern, it has been shown how the thermal effects resulting from the 
release extend almost 9 m from the jet in 1.5 s. 
 
 
 
 
1 
Highlights 
1. Overpressure due to ignited hydrogen release in a garage examined 
2. Pressure due to ignited and unignited release in enclosure compared 
3. Pressure from ignited release two orders of magnitude greater than unignited 
4. Phenomenon should be considered by regulators and engineers 
*Highlights (for review)
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ABSTRACT 
A numerical study has been performed comparing the hazards, in particular overpressures, arising 
from the sustained unignited and ignited release from an onboard hydrogen storage tank at 700 bar 
through a 3.34 mm diameter orifice, representing a thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD) 
in a small garage with a single vent equivalent in area to small window. It has been demonstrated how 
the overpressure predicted in the case of an unignited release using both CFD and an analytical model 
is in the region of 0.55 kPa and thus unlikely to cause structural damage. However, the overpressure 
predicted for the ignited release is two orders of magnitude greater, reaching over 55 kPA in less than 
1 s and thus potentially causing destruction of the structure.  
 
It has been shown that whilst the overpressures resulting from the unignited release are unlikely to 
cause harm, the garage is engulfed by a flammable atmosphere in less than 1 s and the oxygen is 
depleted to levels dangerous to people within this time. In the case of the ignited release, whilst the 
resultant overpressures are the primary safety concern, it has been shown how the thermal effects 
resulting from the release extend almost 9 m from the jet in 1.5 s. 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The commercial use of fuel cell and hydrogen (FCH) technologies is becoming more widespread and 
they will soon form an essential part of our built environment.  There is clear need with emerging 
technologies that a safety level is maintained which is at least the same as those in existing fossil fuel 
applications. The number of hydrogen-powered vehicles in use worldwide is growing, and 
commercialisation is fast approaching a reality, leading to a growth in the necessary indoor use of 
FCH technologies e.g. material handling, forklifts etc. or parking of these vehicles i.e. in a garage or 
car park. By understanding the hazards arising due to placement of hydrogen-fuelled vehicles in 
confined environments, steps can be taken towards reduction of associated hazards and risks by 
inherently safer design. Indeed, safe indoor use has been the focus of recent investigations, in 
particular within the HyIndoor Project [1, 2, 3] 
 
In the majority of passenger cars hydrogen is commonly stored as a compressed gas in tanks. Typical 
storage pressures for vehicle tanks are in the region of 350 bar to 700 bar. Onboard hydrogen storage 
tanks are required by regulation to be equipped with pressure relief devices (PRDs) [4]. These are 
fitted to the fuel tank and function by releasing the fluid in the event of an abnormally high 
temperature, e.g. in conditions of fire. Current PRDs provide rapid release of the hydrogen, thus 
minimising the possibility of catastrophic failure of the tank during exposure to fire. Existing TPRDs 
intend to vent the hydrogen before this catastrophic rupture occurs preventing disastrous explosions. 
High mass flow rates from TPRDs are potentially acceptable outdoors, where the buoyancy of 
hydrogen is an advantage in aiding dispersion below the lower flammability limit. However, from a 
safety perspective a number of hazards arise following a high mass flow rate release, characteristic for 
current TPRDs, in a confined space containing a vent. Previous work on this topic by the authors has 
focused on the overpressure development within an enclosure due to an unignited release.  Preliminary 
numerical and analytical modelling work on this topic by the authors focused on a hypothetical 
scenario, with a constant mass flow rate release [5] and the phenomenon of a rapid rise in pressure 
following the unignited release of hydrogen through a “typical” TPRD (diameter 5.08 mm) in an 
enclosure with a small vent was discovered and explained. It was demonstrated, how for a constant 
release of 0.39 kg/s of hydrogen into a 30.4 m
3
 garage with a single vent the size of one brick the 
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overpressure within the enclosure resulting from the injection of hydrogen reaches a level of 10-20 
kPa, capable of destroying the garage, within only 2 s. The high volumetric flow rate of hydrogen 
results in these significant overpressures even without combustion. For the chosen scenario, if the 
enclosure does not rupture first, the pressure within the garage, reaches a maximum level in excess of 
50 kPa for 350 bar storage and 100 kPa for 700 bar. This maximum pressure then drops off and tends 
towards a steady state value, an order of magnitude lower, and equal to that predicted by the simple 
steady state estimations. For the very specific case examined it was clear that unacceptable levels of 
overpressure above 10-20 kPa are reached within a short timeframe of 1-2 s and subsequent work 
considered “safe” vent sizes for the “pressure peaking” occurring for the same unignited release rate 
and enclosure size [6]. The latter work focusing on more “realistic” scenarios, utilising a blow-down 
model developed at Ulster University to account for mass flow rate decay [7] and suggested “safe” 
TPRD diameters for enclosures of different volumes with different natural ventilation levels. This 
previous work, specifically the geometry and scenario considered “safe” for unignited releases forms 
the basis of the work presented here. The pressure peaking phenomenon for unignited jets, and the 
predicted overpressures has been validated against laboratory scale experiments [8]. It should be 
emphasised that the pressure peaking phenomenon is not evident with other, heavier, fuels such as 
propane. Whilst a small pressure rise is evident for e.g. methane for a comparable leak with minimal 
ventilation, the peak is almost two orders of magnitude lower than that resulting from the hydrogen 
leak and unlikely to cause structural damage [5].    
 
To date the work and recommendations concerning pressure peaking have focused solely on unignited 
releases. In the case of TPRD activation, the most likely cause is fire. Hence, when considering a high 
mass flow release from a TPRD in an enclosure, the scenario of an ignited release cannot be ignored. 
There has been limited published work on hydrogen fires in enclosures, and none on numerical 
simulation of ignited pressure peaking phenomenon, however, it should be noted that there have been 
many studies on free jet fires as discussed by Molkov and Saffers [9]. Recent work at Ulster has 
focused on analytical modelling of the problem [8]. In the case of TPRD release, scenarios with an 
initially high mass flow rate are most representative. However, the most recent experiments on 
hydrogen fires in enclosures have focused on laboratory scale releases [10] and are being used by the 
authors for validation of the CFD approach to enclosure fire modelling, with an emphasis on 
overpressure prediction. This approach has then been applied to a hypothetical scenario where 
pressure peaking is expected to occur. Whilst recommendations have been presented for TPRD 
diameters which will prevent dangerous over pressures in the case of an unignited release [6], it is 
highly likely that the pressure resulting from these “safe” diameters will be significantly higher in the 
event of an ignited release. Hence, this work is driven by the need to understand the hazards resulting 
from the rapid ignited release of hydrogen from onboard storage tanks through a TPRD inside a 
garage-like enclosure with low natural ventilation i.e. the consequences of a jet fire which has been 
immediately ignited, delayed ignition is not considered here. The resultant overpressure is of particular 
interest.  The pressure peaking phenomenon for an ignited release had not been studied numerically 
and compared with that for an equivalent unignited release and it should be emphasised that this work 
has relevance beyond a TPRD scenario and may occur anywhere a momentum driven release occurs in 
an enclosure with minimum ventilation. 
 
2.0 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
Both an unignited and ignited hydrogen release, from typical onboard hydrogen storage tanks at 700 
bar through a TPRD, are considered in a garage type enclosure with a single vent. The hypothetical 
events involve conservative “quasi-steady” constant mass flow rate releases of 0.2993 kg/s through a 
TPRD diameter of 3.34 mm, pressure drop in the storage tank was not considered. The TPRD opening 
time was taken as 0.01 s.  This diameter is lower and hence potentially “safer” than typical 5.08 mm 
diameters. Whilst a smaller diameter minimises the effects of pressure peaking it presents additional 
challenges in that the fire resistance of the hydrogen tank should be sufficient to account for the longer 
blow down period, a 3.34 mm TPRD diameter is reflective of “realistic” values and as shown is a 
“safe” diameter for the unignited release scenarios considered here.  
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A garage with internal dimensions 4.5 x 2.6 x 2.6 m (L x W x H) was considered with a single vent, 
the dimensions of the vent were chosen such the overpressures resulting from an unignited release 
would be “safe”. A vent of 0.35 x 0.55 m (W X H) was selected, this is over 7 times greater than that 
used in the original study [5] and represents an area characteristic of e.g. a small window. The vent 
was centred and was flush with the ceiling. The release was assumed to occur in the centre of the 
garage 0.5 m from the floor. The evolution of flammable mixture formation (unignited case), fire 
dynamics (ignited case) and over pressure in the garage was examined. It is noted that in order for a 
TPRD to be normally activated there is likely to be a fire present in the garage, however, this primary 
fire and the resultant consequences are beyond the scope of this paper. Rather the purpose of the 
analysis was to compare the hazards purely due to the pressure peak caused by an ignited and 
unignited release. 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
CFD was used for both the unignited and ignited cases and the phenomenological model for pressure 
peaking was used in the unignited case. 
3.1 CFD approach 
The CFD package FLUENT [Error! Reference source not found.11] was the base software tool used 
to simulate the high-pressure hydrogen release. A 3D domain with dimensions 15.5 x 6.6 x 7 m (L x 
W x H) was taken, with a distance of 9 m from the domain boundary to the vent. A total of 351,152 
hexahedral control volumes were used with grid refinement inside the garage. The garage and the 
domain were assumed to be initially 100% air at STP. Flow at the PRD exit is supercritical. To avoid 
the high computational expense of resolving this under-expanded region an Ulster University approach 
[7] was used to calculate the equivalent diameter of the jet. This approach was used to calculate the 
parameters of the flow at the notional nozzle, including the mass flow rate. The mass flow rate at the 
TPRD was assumed to increase linearly to mimic an opening time of 0.01 s. Isentropic flow equations 
were used to determine the total temperature and pressure at the leak. 
The garage floor, walls, and roof were of thickness of 0.15 m and were assumed to be constructed of 
concrete. The material properties chosen are similar to brick and concrete typically used for garages in 
the UK. The front wall, on which the vent is located, was taken as aluminium with a thickness of 0.02 
m to represent the garage door.  
Table 1. Material properties used in the garage 
Materials Properties Units Aluminium Concrete 
Density kg/m
3
 2719 2400 
Specific heat (cp) J/kg-K 871 900 
Thermal conductivity W/m-K 202.4 1.5 
Refractive index   1 1 
Internal emissivity   0.09 0.85 
 
A pressure based solver was used with the RNG k-ε Navier-Stokes (RANS) approach. The Pressure-
Implicit with Splitting of Operators (PISO) approach was used for pressure-velocity coupling [12, 13] 
In the case of the ignited release the discrete ordinates method was used to account for radiation and 
the Eddy Dissipation Concept (EDC) model was used for combustion [14]. Ignition was modelled as a 
spark by patching a temperature until it could be confirmed the flame had begun to propagate. This 
combustion modelling approach has been successfully applied by the authors in previous work and is 
described in [15], in the work presented here it is extended to compressible flow. In addition to overall 
convergence, conditions at the boundaries, and mass conservation were monitored. It should be noted 
that even with the existing mesh, simulations with a CFL of 1 took over one month to reach a time of 
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1s. Thus, a more refined mesh was deemed to be prohibitive in terms of computing resources. 
However, a time dependency study was performed, in all cases the initial CFL was kept below 1 until 
ignition was initiated and a flame was established. It was found that increasing the CFL up to 10 did 
not affect the results and this is demonstrated in Section 4. 
3.2 Phenomenological approach 
A system of equations to predict the development of the overpressure within the enclosure with time in 
the assumption of a perfect stirred reactor (perfect mixing of each released fraction of hydrogen with a 
mixture already available within the garage) was presented in [5] and predicted overpressures 
validated in [8]. This model analytical approach has been applied to predict the overpressure in the 
garage in the case of the unignited release. Work is underway to develop such a model for an ignited 
release. 
4.0 RESULTS 
The CFD results for both the ignited and unignited release are discussed in the following section, and 
the pressure dynamics of the unignited case is compared with the analytical prediction.  
4.1 Pressure dynamics 
A comparison of the pressure dynamics predicted using CFD and the phenomenological model for the 
unignited release are presented in Figure 1. It should be noted that losses are taken into account in the 
phenomenological model by using a coefficient of discharge C = 0.6 for the vent [16]. The coefficient 
of discharge represents the ratio between the actual flow discharge and theoretical flow discharge and 
reflects pressure losses through the vent, a value of 1 would represent no losses. 
 
Figure 1. Overpressure in the garage for an unignited release (CFD and analytical model) 
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It can be seen how the predictions by the CFD and phenomenological models are within less than 10% 
of one another. As mentioned a value of 0.6 was used for the coefficient of discharge in the analytical 
model, however, it should be noted that a value of 0.59 was found to match the CFD results. 
It is evident in Figure 1 how the overpressure predicted by the CFD simulation “dips” between 0.3 and 
0.5 s, before rising again, whereas the overpressure predicted by the analytical model follows a smooth 
curve. This can be explained by examining the composition of the mixture in the garage, and the 
vicinity of the vent in particular during this period of time. The phenomenological model considers the 
garage as a perfectly stirred reactor, i.e. the mixture composition is uniform throughout the enclosure. 
It is assumed the garage is initially 100% air and eventually 100% hydrogen. CFD allows for the 
three-dimensional nature of the flow and the non-uniform distribution within the enclosure. Figure 2 
shows the composition (hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen by volume) within the vent at three points in 
time 0.25 s (before dip), 0.37 s (dip) and 0.58 s (after dip). It can be seen that the percentage of 
hydrogen (lighter gas) is somewhat less at 0.37 s than at 0.25 s and 0.58 s, whilst the difference is 
small, the percentage of hydrogen at the vent in the analytical model will grow continuously between 
0.25 s and 0.58 s 
.   
Figure 2. Contours of oxygen, nitrogen and hydrogen mole fraction in the vent area at 0.25 s, 0.37 s, 
and 0.58 s for the unignited release 
 
It is important to note that the overpressure predicted for the unignited release reaches a maximum 
value of less than 0.6 kPa, this level of pressure would not cause structural damage to the garage [17] 
and would be deemed “safe”. In contrast Figure 3 presents a comparison of the overpressure predicted 
for both the ignited and unignited scenario. Two sets of numerical results are presented for the ignited 
case, based on a CFL of 1.2 and of 10, the results are identical and hence overlap. The Courant–
Friedrichs–Lewy or CFL number is a function of velocity, cell-size and time step it is an indication of 
how fluid moves through each cell. For a CFL less than or equal to 1 then the fluid particles move 
from a maximum of one cell to another in one timestep, for a CFL > 1 then particles move through 
more than one cell in each time step. The maximum CFL in the domain occur at the leak outlet where 
the cells are smallest, and the velocity is greatest. 
 
The pressure for the unignited case is negligible compared to the ignited scenario and there is no 
perceivable peak in pressure when plotted alongside the ignited case. It can be clearly seen in Figure 3 
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that the TPRD diameter, vent and leak rate which may seem “safe” when considering an unignited 
release, do in fact lead to pressures capable of destroying the garage in less than 1 s [17] in the event 
that the release is ignited. The overpressure predicted for the ignited release is almost two orders of 
magnitude greater than that predicted for the unignited case, i.e. 100 times greater. This finding raises 
safety concerns for existing TPRDs, and indeed any scenario whereby a rapid, ignited release of 
hydrogen occurs in an enclosure.   
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted overpressure in a garage, for both an unignited and ignited release of 0.299 kg/s  
4.2 Flammable atmosphere for the unignited leak 
The dynamics of flammable hydrogen-air mixture (4-75% vol.) is considered for the unignited release 
scenario. The development of a flammable mixture within the enclosure is presented in Figure 4 for 
the first 1.19 seconds of the release. A 2D slice along the centre axis of the garage is taken, and 
contours of hydrogen mole fraction between 4% and 75% are presented. The formation of a flammable 
layer can be clearly seen. Within 1s almost 100% of the garage is already engulfed by a flammable 
mixture. 
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Figure 4. Contours of hydrogen mole fraction between 4% and 75% showing dynamics of 
flammable hydrogen-air mixture formation for an unignited release 
As the garage fills with a flammable hydrogen-air mixture the quantity of hydrogen exiting the garage 
through the vent will increase resulting in a flammable jet outside the garage. This presents an external 
fire hazard originating from the vent and, in the event of ignition, burn back to the premixed, 
turbulent, flammable mixture inside the garage will result in a significant explosion hazard. The final 
image within Figure 4 clearly illustrates the extent of the flammable jet exiting the vent; at a time of 
1.19 s the jet extends approximately 2 m outside the garage. Thus, it can be shown, how even with a 
relatively large vent a significant fire and explosion hazard develops outside the garage within 1s of 
the release. This has implications for surrounding people and structures. Development of the 
flammable jet was not the primary focus of this work; thus the simulation has not been run beyond 
1.19 s. However, due to the decreasing pressure inside the enclosure the jet is not expected to grow 
further horizontally, rather to become buoyancy driven. It should also be emphasised that this scenario 
represents a very low probability case, i.e. malfunction of the TPRD, as it would be expected that a 
function TPRD would be thermally activated by the presence of fire and hence ignition would occur. 
 
4.3 Oxygen depletion for the unignited leak 
It can be seen from the overpressures presented in section 4.1 that in the event of no ignition during a 
release the structure will not be adversely affected. Again, it should be emphasised that this is a very 
specific scenario and indeed the likelihood of an individual being present in this case is low, 
nevertheless for completeness it is worth understanding additional potential human effects of an 
unignited release. While hydrogen itself is not a toxic gas, the presence of a leak can lead to 
asphyxiation as a result of oxygen depletion. The physiological hazards due to oxygen depletion are 
described in [18] where 15-19 percent by volume oxygen is said to lead to “decreased ability to 
perform tasks; may induce early symptoms in persons with heart, lung, or circulatory problems” and 
8-10 percent by volume of oxygen is said to lead to “nausea, vomiting, unconsciousness, ashen face, 
fainting and mental failure”. In the configuration considered, 19% oxygen by volume is reached with 
1s as illustrated in Figure 5. Note that at 0 s the garage has a concentration of 21% oxygen by volume 
throughout so the coloured areas in the figure represent the regions where the concentration is 
decreasing. So whilst the relatively large vent ensures that the garage will withstand the pressure of the 
unignited release the risk for human to be “trapped” by hydrogen and unable to evacuate is present.  
8 
  
   
 
0.37 s 0.69 s 1.19 s  
Figure 5. Contours of oxygen mole fraction between 0% and 19% with the garage for the first 1 s of 
the unignited release 
4.4 Flame development for the ignited release 
It is clear from section 4.1 that the overpressure resulting from an ignited release would be capable of 
destroying the garage within 1 s, and it is this overpressure, as opposed to the thermal effects which is 
the most significant safety concern. However, the flame development within, and external to the 
garage are presented in this section for completeness. Figure 6 illustrates the hydroxyl (OH) contours 
on a 2D slice along the centre axis of the garage for the first 2 s of the ignited release. Mole fraction of 
hydroxyl in a flame of 0.01 is characteristic for combustion at normal atmospheric conditions thus OH 
concentration is an indication of where burning is occurring. In the initial period of the release (up to 
0.025 s) the burning region is a consequence of the ignition position. CFD has provided an interesting 
insight into some unusual flow phenomenon occurring within the garage. It can be seen how after 0.25 
s the external flame, exiting the vent appears to “split”, whilst later (as seen at 1.78 s), when the garage 
is completely filled with hydrogen the entire vent is filled with burning mixture.  
 
Figure 6. Contours of hydroxyl mole fraction showing dynamics of flame development for the ignited 
release 
In order to explain this “split” of the external flame both horizontal and vertical 2D slices of OH mole 
fraction through the centre plane of the vent are presented in Figure 7, in addition a 3D image of the 
flame surface is shown at the same point in time. Figure 7 focuses on the region between 0.25 s and 
0.5 s where the “split” occurs. In the initial 0.5 s of the release the flame spreads along the ceiling and 
down to the vent, in addition the flame spreads along the side walls of the garage to the vent. 
However, whilst the flame is spreading the growing pressure within the garage causes air to be forced 
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out through the vent, in addition to the burning mixture.  The resultant flow regime leads to a period of 
approximately 1s where the flow exiting the vent is a combination of pressurised air in the centre of 
the vent and burning mixture around the top and base of the vent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Horizontal plane through 
the vent centre 
Vertical plane through 
the vent centre 
3D Iso-surface of OH  
 
   
0.25 s 
   
0.28 s 
   
0.31 s 
   
0.34 s 
   
0.4 s 
   
0.45 s 
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0.51 s 
Figure 7. Contours of hydroxyl mole fraction along horizontal and vertical planes through the 
midpoint of the vent, alongside a 3D iso-surface of hydroxyl mole fraction for the period 0.25-0.51 s  
4.5 Thermal effects and the external flame for the ignited release 
As mentioned the overpressure resulting from the ignited release is the primary safety concern 
highlighted by this work. However, it can be seen from Figure 6 that in the event of an ignited release 
within the garage an external flame rapidly develops through the garage vent. This external flame 
reaches a maximum length of approximately 3 m around 1.56 s. Clearly, this has implications for 
surrounding life and infrastructure.  But it should be noted that 3 m is an indication of the flame 
length, the distance at which there is no danger to a person is longer than this again. Separation 
distances from an ignited hydrogen leak are discussed in [19].  A temperature of 70
o 
C or 343 K can be 
taken as a no harm limit at which point there is no danger to people. Temperature contours along a 2D 
slice, limited to 343 K are shown in Figure 8 for the first 1.17 s of the release. It can be seen how in 
this time a temperature of 70
o 
C is reached at a distance of almost 7 m from the vent. Beyond this time 
the garage would be destroyed by overpressure. However, for completeness the temperature contours 
at 1.56 s (i.e. when the maximum external flame exists) are shown in Figure 9. It can be seen how the 
no harm distance is in the region of 9 m. 
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Figure 8 Temperature contours showing “no harm” distance of 70o C for the first 1.17 s of the ignited 
release. Note garage is 4.5 m long. 
 
Figure 9 Temperature contours showing “no harm” distance of 70o C at 1.56 s of the ignited release 
(the point of maximum flamelength). Note garage is 4.5 m long. 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
A hypothetical scenario has been considered where hazards have been investigated, in particular 
overpressures which arise from the sustained unignited and ignited release from an onboard hydrogen 
storage tank at 700 bar through a 3.34 mm diameter orifice, representing the TPRD in a small garage 
with a single vent equivalent in area to small window. The work has focused on the overpressures 
arising purely as a result of the ignited and unignited release and the primary fire which may have 
activated the TPRD has not been included in the analysis. It has been shown how the overpressure 
predicted in the case of an unignited release using both CFD and an analytical model is in the region 
of 0.55 kPa and thus unlikely to cause structural damage. However, the overpressure predicted for the 
ignited release is two orders of magnitude greater, reaching over 55 kPA in less than 1 s and thus 
potentially causing destruction of the structure.  
 
In the case that the TPRD malfunctions, rather than being thermally activated, the resultant unignited 
release is unlikely to cause harm to the structure unless ignited, in which case a significant hazard 
exists as the garage is engulfed by a flammable atmosphere in less than 1 s. An unignited release is 
however detrimental for an person within the garage as the oxygen is depleted to levels dangerous to 
people within this time. In the case of the ignited release, whilst the resultant overpressures are the 
primary safety concern, it has been shown how the thermal effects resulting from the release extend 
almost 9 m from the jet in 1.5 s.  
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Further numerical studies are required to investigate the pressure peaking phenomenon for ignited 
releases in order that safety recommendations can be made.  The results presented are the first of their 
kind and application of this work extends beyond TPRDs and is relevant where there is a rapid, ignited 
release of hydrogen in an enclosure with limited ventilation 
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